Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/23

RV 7 (Chap II.) this Subterfuge, which requires the Use of Reason for the Discovery of these general Truths: Since it must be confessed, that in their Discovery, there is no Use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, that the Knowledge of this Maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is a deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of those Principles to depend on the labour of our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos'd, that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?

§. 11. Those who will take the Pains to reflect with a little attention on the Operations of the Understanding, will find that this ready Assent of the Mind to some Truths, depends not either on native Inscription, nor the Use of Reason; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our Assent to these Maxims, if by saying, that Men know and assent to them, when they come to the Use of Reason, be meant, That the use of Reason assists us in the Knowledge of these Maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

§. 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, when we come to the use of Reason be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to the use of Reason, they come also to know and assent to these Maxims; this also is false, and frivolous. First, It is false: because it is evident these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the use of Reason; and therefore the coming to the use of Reason is falsly assigned, as the time of their Discovery. How many instances of the use of Reason may we observe in Children a long time before they have any Knowledge of this Maxim, That it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be? and a great part of illiterate People, and Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Ages, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. I grant Men come not to the Knowledge of these general and more abstract Truths, which are thought innate till they come to the use of Reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the use of Reason, those general abstract Idea's are not framed in the Mind, about which those general Maxims are, which are mistaken for innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made, and Verities introduced and brought into the Mind by the same Way, and discovered by the same Steps, as several other Propositions, which no Body was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore a Necessity, that Men should come to the use of Reason, before they get the Knowledge of those general Truths: but deny, that Men's coming to the use of Reason is the time of their Discovery.

§. 13. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying that Men know, and assent to these Maxims, when they come to the use of Reason, amounts in reality of Fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of before the use of Reason, but may possibly be assented to sometime after during a Man's Life; but when, is uncertain: And so may all other knowable Truths as well as these, which therefore have no Advantage, nor distinction from others by this Note of being known when we come to the use of Reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.