Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge.djvu/107

 original wool is left, but it is the same sock. The truth is that each time we affirm the self-identity of this object we are construing the group of associations, which we recognise, in a more and more attenuated sense. The object which is both the sock at the end and the sock at the beginning is a very attenuated complex type of permanence, which would not be what we meant by the sock merely at the beginning of its career or as perceived merely at the end of its career. By insisting on the continued identity of the sock, we are in fact continually juggling with what we mean by the sock, always retaining the most complete associations which we can trace through the whole continuous series of events forming the successive situations of the sock. The physical object ‘works’ perfectly for the ordinary usage of life, and is thus fully justified for that purpose in the eyes of the pragmatic philosopher.

24.91 But these objects do represent essential facts of nature; sometimes, as it may seem to us, trivial facts not worth disentangling from the events which are their situations, sometimes useful facts. But their essential character is exemplified when we reach biological facts. A living organism exhibits a certain unity of being which is merely the exhibition of the enhanced importance of the unity of the physical object.

25. Scientific Objects. 25.1 ‘The various types of scientific objects arise from the determination of the characters of the active conditioning events which are essential factors in the recognition of sense-objects.

The perceptual judgment which is present in the completed recognition of physical objects introduces the notion of hypothetical perceptions by percipient