Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/45

 and represent as laudable and innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.

the Whole, then, it seems undeniable, that there is such a Sentiment in human Nature as disinterested Benevolence; that nothing can bestow more Merit on any human Creature than the Possession of it in an eminent Degree; and that a Part, at least, of its Merit arises from its Tendency to promote the Interests of our Species, and bestow Happiness on human Society. We carry our View into the salutary Consequences of such a Character and Disposition; and whatever has so benign an Influence, and forwards so desirable an End is beheld with Complacency and Pleasure. The social Virtues are never regarded without their beneficial Tendencies, nor view'd as barren and unfruitful. The Happiness of Mankind, the Order of Society, the Harmony of Families, the mutual Support of Friends are always consider'd as the Result of their gentle Dominion over the Breasts of Men.

considerable a Part of their Merit we ought to ascribe to their Utility, will better appear from future Disquisitions ; as well as the Reason, why this Circumstance has such a Command over our Esteem and Approbation.