Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/198

 racter with others seems to arise only from a Care of preserving a Character with ourselves, in order to which we find it necessary to prop our tottering Judgment on the correspondent Approbation of Mankind.

in order to accommodate Matters, and remove, if possible, every Difficulty, let us allow all these Reasonings to be false. Let us allow, that when we resolve the Pleasure, that arises from Views of Utility, into the Sentiments of Humanity and Sympathy, we have embrac'd a wrong Hypothesis. Let us confess it necessary to find some other Explication of that Applause, which is paid to all Objects, whether inanimate, animate or rational, if they have a Tendency to promote the Welfare and Advantage of others. However difficult it be to conceive, that an Object is approv'd of, on Account of its Tendency to a certain End, while the End itself is totally indifferent; let us swallow this Absurdity, and consider what are the Consequences. The preceding Delineation or Definition of VIRTUE must still retain its Evidence and Authority: It must still be allow'd, that every Quality of the Mind, which is useful or agreeable to the Person himself or to others, communicates a Pleasure to the Spectator, engages his Esteem, and is admitted under the honourable Denomination of Virtue or Merit. Are