Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/170

 As a certain Proof, that the whole Merit of Benevolence is not deriv'd from its Usefulness, we may observe, that, in a kind Way of Blame, we say, a Person is too good; when he exceeds his Part in Society, and carries his Attention for others beyond the proper Bounds and Measure. In like Manner, we say a Man is too high-spirited, too intrepid, too indifferent about Fortune: Reproaches, which really, at the bottom, imply more Regard and Esteem than many Panegyrics. Being accustom'd to rate the Merit and Demerit of Characters chiefly by their useful or pernicious Tendencies, we cannot forbear applying the Epithet of Blame, when we discover a Sentiment, which rises to a Degree that is hurtful: But it may happen, at the same Time, that its noble Elevation, or its engaging Tenderness so seizes the Heart, as rather to encrease our Friendship and Concern for the Person.

THE Amours and Attachments of Harry the IVth, during the civil Wars of the League, frequently hurt his Interest and his Cause; but all the young, at