Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/123

 to the Good-will, Esteem, and Services of others, than one entirely devoid of them; if, in short, the Sentiments be similar, that arise from these Endowments and from the social Virtues; is there any Reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a Word, or doubting whether they are entitled to the Denomination of Virtue ? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the Sentiment of Approbation, which those Accomplishments produce, besides its being inferior, is also somewhat different from that, which attends the Virtues of Justice and Humanity. But this seems not a sufficient Reason for ranking them entirely under different Classes and Appellations. The Character of Cæsar and that of Cato, as drawn by Salust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest Sense of the Word; but in a different Way: Nor are the Sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces Love; the other,