Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/115

 vation we must, a priori, conclude it impossible for such a Creature as Man to be totally indifferent to the Well or Ill-being of his Fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular Byass, that what promotes their Happiness is good, what tends to their Misery is evil, without any farther Regard or Consideration. Here then are the faint Rudiments, at least, or Outlines, of a general Distinction betwixt Actions; and in Proportion as the Humanity of the Person is suppos'd to encrease, his Connexion to those injur'd or benefited, and his lively Conception of their Misery or Happiness; his consequent Censure or Approbation acquires proportionable Force and Vigour. There is no Necessity, that a generous Action, barely mention'd in an old History or remote Gazette, should communicate any strong Feelings of Applause and Admiration. Virtue, plac'd at such a Distance, is like a fixt Star, which, tho', to the Eye of Reason, it may appear as luminous as the Sun in his Meridian, is so infinitely remov'd, as to affect the Senses, neither with Light nor Heat. Bring this Virtue nearer, by our Acquaintance or Connexion with the Persons, or even by an eloquent Narration and Recital of the Case; our Hearts are immediately caught, our Sympathy enliven'd, and our cool Approbation converted into the warmest Sentiments of Friendship and Regard. These seem necessary and