Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/158

 we shall find, that all our Faculties can never carry us farther in our Knowledge of this Relation, than barely to observe, that particular Objects are constantly conjoin'd together, and that the Mind is carry'd, by a customary Transition, from the Appearance of the one to the Belief of the other. But tho' this Conclusion concerning human Ignorance be the Result of the strictest Scrutiny and Examination of this Subject, Men still entertain a strong Propensity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the Powers of Nature, and perceive something like a necessary Connexion betwixt the Cause and the Effect. When again they turn their Reflections towards the Operations of their own Minds, and feel no such Connexion of the Motive and the Action; they are apt, from thence, to suppose, that there is a Difference betwixt the Effects, resulting from material and brute Force, and those which arise from Thought and Intelligence. But being once convinc'd, that we know nothing farther of Causation of any Kind, than merely the constant Conjunction of Objects, and the consequent Inference of the Mind from one to another, and finding, that these two Circumstances are universally acknowledged to have place in voluntary Actions; we may thence be more easily led to own the same Necessity, common to all Causes. And tho' this Reasoning may contradict the Systems of many Philosophers, in ascribing Necessity to the Determinations of the Will, we shall find, upon Reflection, that they dissent from it in Words only,