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Concerning Метр/аура.

Partï" lli

In this precedent Scheme, all the feveralthings or notions, to which names are to be alligned, are reduced to forty Genna’s. The Нгй fix of

which do comprehend fuch matters, as by reafon of their Generalnefs, or in fome other refpeû, are above all thofe common heads of things called Predicaments; The гей belonging to the feveral Predicarnent:f„ of

which I reckon only live. Amongft thefe, Sub ance doth take in fourteen Gent/:'s, Quantity three, ,Qgalitj five, A ion. four, and Relaf» tion eight. ‹. ‚. t. `

This being fuppofed to be a fufiicient general Scheme of things, that whichis next to be enquired after, is how each of thofe Genue's may be

fubdivided into its proper differences and fpecies. In order to which I fhall offer that which follows.

In the enumeration of all fuch things and notions as fall under di fcourfe, thofe are бгй to be conlidered which are more general or сош

prehenfive, belonging either to Metaphjßc, or to Grarnrnar and Logic. Tho particular: are flrů in the order of Being, yet General: are Бгй in the order of Knowing, becaufe by thefe, fuch things and notions as are lels . general, are to be diltinguifhed and defined.

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Now the proper end and defign of Metaphyfìc Íhould be to enume rate and explain thofe more .general terms, which by~reafon of their

ILlniverlality and Comprehenlivenefs, are either aho've all thofe Heads of things liiled Predicaments, or elfe common to jë'veral of them. And if this Science had been fo ordered, as to have conteined a'plaip regular enumeration and defcription of thefe general terms,without thie mixture

of nice and fubtle difputes about them 5 It might have been 7„proper e nough for learners to have begun with. 4But men having purpofely

{irained their Witsto frame and difcufs fo many intricate queftions, as are commonly treated of in it : 'Tis no wonder that it Íhould hereby be

judice andnotneglelïil riper beginners, judgments.butThat rendred, onel of lefsthofe fit forofyoung liablewhich] alfo toaim the at prein treating concerning thefe things', is to offer fome brief and plain de~ fcription of them, as being confcious that fuch matters as are prinz?) nota,

and той obvious, are шой hard to be defined. And the multiplying of words,about things that are plain enough of themfelves,doth but con

tribute to the making of them more obfcure. The ri ht ordering of thefe Tranfcendentals isa bufinefs of no fmall diñicultyiecaufe there is fo little aíflfiance or help to be had for it in the Common Syftems, according to which this part of Philofophy ( as it feems to me ) is rendred th‘e той rude and imperfect in the whole bo dy of Sciencesgasif the compilers of it had taken no other care for thofe General notions, which did not fall within the ordinary feries of things,

and were not explicable in other particular Sciences _, but only to tum ble them together in feveral confufed heaps, which they ftiled the Sci

ence of Terms Metaphyßc. is`one reafon of fuch is veryAnd fhortthis and`def1cient in wh refy the ufual enumeration Рей of whatit ought to — be,many of thoíe thin s being left out, which do properly belong to this number 5 which defeâs 'are here intended to be in fome meafure fuppli

ed. Tho it muli be granted, that by reafon of the exceeding compre heiî/îoeneß of fome notions, and the extremefùlitilty of others, as like wi e becaufe of the ftreightnels of that method which I am bound up¿o _ Y