Page:Amicus brief - Stoneridge v Scientific-Atlanta - Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.pdf/24

 15 Moreover, this Court’s approach is “to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995). In particular, the Court has cabined the implied § 10(b) cause of action so that it does not render superfluous the restrictions in other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See, e.g., Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 178-79 (“we use the express causes of action in the Securities Acts as the primary model for the § 10(b) action”); id. at 182-83; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-10 (1976); Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 736. Examination of the provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts shows that the § 10(b) implied action should not be extended to create private civil claims for “scheme” liability. First, it would improperly override the limits on the express civil claims created by Congress. Second, it would undo Congressional decisions that only the SEC and the Justice Department may sue defendants for participating in a scheme. “The fact that Congress chose to impose some forms of secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate congressional choice with which the courts should not interfere.” Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 184. Third, “scheme” liability does not satisfy the established reliance and loss causation elements necessary for primary liability in a § 10(b) private cause of action. A. “Scheme” Liability Would Nullify Statutory Restrictions On The Express Private Rights Of Action In The 1933 And 1934 Acts. One statutory provision should not be interpreted to render another provision a “practical nullity.” United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 375 (1988). Thus, this Court will not “expand the defendant class for 10b5 actions beyond the bounds delineated for comparable express causes of action.” Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 180; see also Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1104 (“we would have trouble inferring any congressional urgency to depend on implied private actions to deter violations of § 14(a), when Congress expressly provided private rights of action in