Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 8.djvu/191

 NUMBER AS DETERMINING FORM OF GROUP 179

the serious extreme. This variation was illustrated in the case of English politics at the transition from mediaeval to modern time ; that is, it appeared in the fact that England no longer sought possessions and immediate power upon the continent, but always possessed a power which stood potentially between the continental governments. Already in the sixteenth century it was said : " France and Spain are the scales of the European balance ; England, however, is the tongue or the holder of the balance." This case occurs, however, only when the potential capacity of the third party is considerable, because, if this power is trans- formed into a merely potential operation, it sacrifices in a very large degree its effective force, and it withdraws to a distance at which a power that is not very substantial would no longer enjoy much respect.

But the advantage which accrues to the third party from the fact that he has to the two others a relationship a priori equal, equally independent, and for that very reason decisive, is not solely dependent upon the fact that these two are in a relation- ship of hostility. It is enough, on the contrary, that between them there is only a certain degree of variation, alienation, or qualitative dualism. This is, indeed, the universal formula of the type, of which the hostility of the elements constitutes merely a special, although the most frequent, case. The following, for instance, is a very characteristic situation of advantage for a tertius, resulting from the mere duality: If B is under obligations to perform for A a certain definitely limited duty, and this obligation passes from B to C and D, between whom the per- formance is to be divided, it is a very natural temptation for A to impose upon each of the two, if possible, a fraction more than the half, so that in the aggregate he enjoys more than before, when the duty was in a single hand. In 1751 the government of Bohemia was obliged to forbid, in the case of the division of peasant holdings by the proprietors, the imposition upon each partial holding of more than its proportional share of the burden of customary service which attached to the undivided holding. In division of an obligation between two, the impression prevails that each individual has still less to do than the former individual