Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 8.djvu/142

130, which gives all existences their meaning, is being worked out in the future, and hence that the future is superior to the present, is at first sight very plausible, and opens up an inviting vista of thought; but, in the form which it has been given by the author, it is totally devoid of content, confused, and unilluminating. In order that the future may be actually ascendant in the consciousness of living individuals, it must, of course, be assumed that future development can be predetermined with sufficient accuracy to form a basis of ethical judgments and of motives; otherwise the entire system of ethics would vanish into the air. In other words, if the future is to control, it must control through becoming part of consciousness. In every other sense it has controlled long ago, both because the forces of evolution have always been active, and because men at all times have peered into the future, and have, as far as possible, directed their actions toward the end of the most permanent efficiency. If more is to happen, it can come about only by a clearer conception of the actual contents of the future, which would virtually be rendering the future a part of the present. This metaphysical puzzle of placing the controlling center of human action beyond consciousness the author has done nothing to solve. Apparently the only way out of it is to take refuge in the idea of the subconscious or of the unconscious, in the mystic forces of human nature, or in the creation of a religion of the future; of course, if this were done, the philosophical meaning of the author's contention would be destroyed. So we cannot avoid the conclusion that, beyond the general idea that in forming our ethical judgments we must look toward the future, the author's theory is devoid of positive content. It points the way rather to an evolutionary religion, or an evolutionary poetry, than to an evolutionary philosophy, because the first object of the latter should be to explain the actual processes of evolution; and that the author's theory absolutely fails to do.

The sharp division which the author introduces between systems of civilization in which the present is ascendant, and those which presage an ascendency of the future, does not correspond with the facts which have been scientifically ascertained by history, and, we may almost say, which are matter of current knowledge. While the ancient world lacked the theory of evolution, it certainly, in the conduct of life, was by no means devoid of the feeling that the future development of the state is of the highest importance. Nor is it necessary to point out that, when Christian doctrine took the place of ancient philosophy, it was not the future, in the sense of the general