Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/847

 ETHICS OF WEALTH 833

Professor Ely's conception is more restrictive. "Luxuries," he says, "are things which minister to such undesirable wants as love of display, vanity, or selfish desire to exalt one's self above one's fellows and thus to produce separation."

Professor Senior comprehends the difficulty of the situation and comments as follows : "The question whether a given com- modity is to be considered as a decency or a luxury is obviously one to which no answer can be given, unless the place, the time, and the rank of the individual using it be specified." "A car- riage," he continues, "is a decency to a woman of fashion, a necessary to a physician, and a luxury to a tradesman."

The Frenchman M. Baudrillait says in substance that every- thing superfluous is a luxury. J. B. Say characterizes those com- modities as luxuries which are both superfluous and dear.

M. de Laveleye, in an article in the Popular Science Monthly for March, 1881, entitled " Morals of Luxury," states his view as follows : " I designate as an object of luxury everything that does not answer to some primary need, and which, costing much money and consequently much labor, is within the reach of only a small number of persons."

It is obviously not desirable that we should attempt to formu- late an exact definition of the term "luxury" which should be sufficiently inclusive and sufficiently exclusive. It seems best, however, for the purposes of this discussion to adopt a concep- tion of the term "luxury" which would include all that anyone might reasonably contend should be now included in that term. With this broad conception in view, then, let us repeat the ques- tion propounded above, viz.: Does the ethics of citizenship demand that we shall forswear luxuries in every form ? M. de Laveleye's answer to this inquiry would be practically "yes." He formulates a broad and comprehensive definition of luxury, and then says: "Some distinguish between a luxury that is vir- tuous, permissible, and even laudable, and one which is improper and immoral. I cannot admit the distinction, and I believe that the rigorous school is right."

It is not so clear, however, that the position of the "rigorous school" so-called is tenable. The ethics of citizenship in this