Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/593

Rh in the case of the earlier, to the origin and support of society, and, in the case of the later, to society's inner nature; but this difference only indicates how in general at the present time the interest in origins, as well as in destinies, is giving way to the interest in character. Today we are not much disposed to think of anything as actually made or created—as coming suddenly into being. Things simply are, or, if their making is to be considered at all, being evolved, they actually participate in their own making, so that, again, what they are, not when or how they arose, is the living question about them.

Briefly and specifically, what I wish to show is: (1) that the contract theory, like any theory in history which might be mentioned, has quite outgrown itself, the contract that makes society proving to be only a political philosopher's name for the fundamental lawfulness of nature or as the same thing for the natural respect of man, a rational being, for law, for law as such; (2) that through this deepening of the conception of the social contract the organic and thoroughly naturalistic theory has been evolved; and (3) that—particularly in response to the doctrine of equality among men–the result in both theory and practice has been greater unity of man with himself, as in the character of the individual of today; greater unity of man with his fellow, notably in the development of a conscious internationalism; and greater unity of man with nature in industrialism.

As given by Thomas Hobbes in 1651, the social-contract theory assumes, in the first place, that a formal contract, for example the American constitution, creates a social or political unity which has had no existence before the enactment itself. By the enactment or acceptance of the contract a group of separate individuals, whether already formed political bodies or single persons, is transformed into a unity, that is, a society or state. As Hobbes said, in substance, a condition of absolute individualism and warfare is changed—as if by magic—to a condition of social integrity and peace. But, secondly, this theory includes also the doctrine of "natural rights," of rights as the independent inalienable possessions of individuals, the