Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/270

 256 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

seems stronger when we remember that the psychologists are teaching us that every conscious act combines the three cardinal aspects of consciousness : that feeling, and willing, and thinking are inextricably woven to form its texture. Will not the good report itself in feeling? and can it report itself in any other way ? It is thus that the case appears to the student ; and one must admit that there is truth, some truth, in his contention.

The question is concerning the criterion of conscious action. Is there anywhere assurance for the man who would act rightly, a standard by which he can measure and test his efforts, as the judge tests the law by precedent, and the theologian his truth by authority. Plainly there must be such a standard ; for ethical thought the evaluation of conduct must have used it; there must be somewhere a common coin of the realm which shall measure. But the newcomer into the field of ethics is like a stranger in a strange land, unable to understand the language, and not in possession of the money of the country. In the midst of this confusion, a simple solution is gracefully presented to him. He welcomes it gladly, and is bound to it until the exigencies of trade put him in possession of other and better standards ; but that which bridged the crisis of his youth is ever dear to him. Such a standard as this one receives from the utilitarians easy, appealing, useful, noble ; but is it satisfactory, and why not ?

Mill has defined the ultimate end for utilitarianism as "an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality ; .... this being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action is necessarily also the standard." The first great difficulty that arises, in dealing with the system, is to understand and measure these qualities of pleasure. Most writers agree that experiences have a common tone of pleasantness, in which they differ by a more-or-less, and, when regarded with respect to this alone, they can be measured and compared numerically. Does this exhaust their " feels " ? When two possible experiences are offered whose promised pleasantnesses are equal, how shall choice be made ? Ethical writers are in the habit of saying that