Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/207

 THE SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY 1 93

into functions of all the others. Both Emerson and Carlisle have rung changes upon portions of this theme. " No man can be heroic except in an heroic world," and the theory that we worship great men because they express to us our implicit selves, and help toward due valuation of ourselves, with possibly similar appraisal in other minds, both posit the desire for social valuation to which we are calling attention. The society in which the individual might most completely achieve himself would be a mutual-admiration society. Each member's potential excel- lence would be helped into actuality by each other member's recognition of the partially realized excellence.

Without having attempted a final analysis of the sociability desire, we have indicated by these two marks certain qualitative traits of a distinct factor in human individuality. It develops in other directions, to be sure, as in ambition for prestige among men and for power over men ; but we have sufficiently indicated distinctive marks of this factor. If some extraordinary provision could be made for the wants of a human being aside from satis- factions of sociability, the abundance of all things else would not prevent ultimate discovery of a radical lack. Assertion of personality in distinction from other personality, and exchange of recognitions of personal valuation, are as proper incidents of human satisfaction as supply of the bodily demand for food and air.

(</) The knowledge desire. It is hardly necessary to insist upon the abstract proposition that the human individual wants to know. We encounter incredulity only when we try to follow the implications of the universal knowledge desire, in case they begin to reveal indications of larger destiny for all men than the present state of knowledge permits. Without pursuing inquiry very far in this direction, we may enter another detail in our specifications of the real individual.

It would doubtless be entirely superfluous to argue with any reader of these papers that knowledge is good both as a means to other goods, and also as an activity of the person without reference to any ulterior end. Whether the judgment is suscep- tible of logical confirmation or not, it is part and parcel of