Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/165

 ETHICS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS I$I

observable in the sub-human world is the prevention of maxi- mum development, and the maintenance in its stead of a com- paratively low level of life. The process is thus much like the slow advance of a line of men in battle. Those who rush ahead are the first killed by the enemy.

As regards the truth of that second assertion which we have stated to be implicit in Mr. Spencer's theory ; namely, that the interests and even the existence of the individual may rightfully be subordinated to the welfare of the species, a positive denial must be entered, so far at least as regards its application to man. In the manner in which this demand is made by Mr. Spencer, such a sacrifice can be justified according to neither transcendental nor utilitarian systems of ethics. For, if, as the transcendentalist holds, man is a partaker in the Divine Reason, and his moral consciousness is therefore a partial manifestation, as it were, of the World Spirit, he has moral rights and duties as such, and is thus distinguished from a thing. And, this being so, it is ethically improper to treat the individual simply as a means to an end, even though that end be the welfare of his race. This, of course, does not mean that the social welfare should under no circumstances be preferred to the individual's good, but only that when one individual, or society at large, assumes to control the actions or destinies of other individuals, the motive should be one in which there is involved the recogni- tion that those other individuals are persons, not things ; that they, each of them, are ends unto themselves, and that therefore the action to be taken can only be justified if the object sought to be realized is one which those individuals would themselves recognize to be a desirable one, if they were to reason regarding it intelligently and impartially. It is true that in many cases where social coercion may justly be applied the coerced one may not admit its rightfulness or submit willingly to its opera- tion. In such a conflict superior might finally determines the issue. But if the compelled one be honest and intelligent according to his opportunities, he cannot be said to be immoral in his resistance ; nor, on the other hand, if the action of the superior force has been controlled by the principle just