Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 5.djvu/563

Rh not objective. But it cannot be the individual opinion of any and all persons, for then the standard set up by criminals, cranks, and degenerates would be of equal value with that set up by others, a position practically held by the sophists. The true criterion of right and wrong must, therefore, be the personal belief of each normal person who makes a conscientious effort to know the right. This effort consists partly in seeking social confirmation. " In order to know the law of God you must interrogate not only your own conscience, but also the conscience and consent of humanity." It also consists partly in criticising and improving upon the existing standards of humanity. In this way do the beliefs regarding right change with every individual and every race and generation. But they are purely subjective and personal, and can be changed, not by arguing or by legislation, but by conversion. The heart, the subconscious self, the moral character, the religious faith, the passions and desires, are their foundation, and only as these change do men's beliefs of right change.

Beliefs in right, as they spread through society by propa- ganda and conversion, lead to action. This action is the united action of those believing alike. Its social consequences are the new coercive relations which it imposes upon those who do not accept the belief. These are " popular rights." Subjective right here becomes objective. " Adjective " right becomes "substantive." It becomes a social relation. Austin says that "a so-called law set by general opinion" is "not a law in the proper signification of the term," but that it is closely analogous to a law proper, and differs only in the fact that the law in the one case is established and obedience is exacted by an uncertain and indeterminate body of persons, and in the other case by a certain and determinate body. These analogous and indeterminate " laws " are the basis of popular rights. As soon, however, as popular rights begin to find expression through the determinate, constituted authorities of the state, whether judges, legislators, executives, constitutional conventions, or referenda,