Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 4.djvu/48

 32 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOG\

not revive the Illinois statute restricting to eight hours per day the work of female employes engaged in manufacture, which was enacted in 1893 and annulled by the state supreme court in 1895. -^^ does, however, by overruling virtually every proposi- tion laid down by the Illinois court in that decision, give «atis- factory assurance that the next eight-hours' law enacted in Illinois, if restricted in its terms to occupations dangerous to the health of the employes, must stand as good law, and cannot be annulled. This decision also renders it probable that legisla- tion in regard to the hours of labor will, henceforth, deal not especially with women or children, but with all the employes in occupations injurious to the human organism. Thus the miners in Illinois may obtain statutory confirmation of the eight-hours' day which they now enjoy only by means of contracts enforced by the dread of renewed strikes. And the women in the Massa- chusetts cotton mills who tend ever-increasing numbers of machines, at ever-increasing rates of speed, will be entitled to claim legislative restriction of the hours of labor on their behalf, on the ground of the exhausting nature of their occupation. The same reasoning applies to all the women driving foot-power sewing machines in sweatshops and to numerous other employ- ments.

The logical result of this decision should be renewed activity on behalf of the statutory eight-hours' working day for all young people, on grounds of health ; and for all adults in occupations injurious to the health. While it seems reasonable to suppose that, in view of this federal precedent, state supreme courts would not annul such statutes, it would be safer to embody in state constitutions provisions similar to those already embodied in the state constitutions of Massachusetts and Utah. Effort for legislative restriction of the work day need not, however, be deferred to await such action ; for this precedent is of such weight, and so explicit that, after it, state courts will have either to ignore it willfully, or to change the lines of reasoning which they have followed hitherto.

The immediate practical lesson of this decision for the advo-