Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 3.djvu/857

 PLAN FOR THE CONTROL OF QUASI-PUBLIC WORKS 843

i. A stock company is formed, and, by the terms of incorporation, the stockholders assign their shares to a self-perpetuating board of trustees, who are given irrevocable power to vote the same for directors. Thus, if a majority of the shares should fall into the hands of one person, he would have no control of the company. The articles of incorporation provide that "Any member of the board of trustees may be removed by the Marion circuit court upon the showing that said trustee is an employe* or holder of any of the securities or capital stock of any other company organized for the purpose of manufactur- ing or delivering artificial or natural gas to consumers residing in, or in the vicinity of, the city of Indianapolis, or for any corrupt practice or any misconduct which said court may deem detrimental to the inter- ests of said company." It is, therefore, practically impossible for the enterprise to fall into the hands of a rival, even though the latter might buy up all the shares of stock.

The trustees serve without compensation. The board appointed in the beginning by the articles of incorporation is almost certain to be composed of reliable men. Their terms are not limited in the case of the gas trust, but it may seem more desirable to have a certain num- ber of the trustees go out of office at stated intervals in order to bring new ideas in, and to prevent the whole board from growing too old. The board fills vacancies in its own body. It is, therefore, not under the control of stockholders, nor of the political authorities, though it may be controlled by a legal process if there is evidence of corruption or mismanagement. The organization is thus seen to be similar to that of our best universities. The means of public control must be found in public opinion, which needs to be aroused only when friction occurs. But since the trustees can derive no pecuniary advantage from the management of the concern, they must serve from the social motive, and may be expected to regard their trusts. It is true that an educational institution may be more sensitive to public opinion than one of these natural monopolies, because students may easily be turned to some other school ; but, on the other hand, the standards by which the service of one of these public enterprises may be judged are more likely to be intelligently held by the general public, so that public opinion is more likely to be rational. If able business men are willing to give their time to the oversight of a great university purely from the social motive, and manage it more entirely as a public trust than any purely private or wholly public institution is managed, it is not