Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 3.djvu/527

 SOCIAL CONTROL 513

till St. Paul made it the cornerstone of his theology. After- ward adopted by Augustine and Calvin, it became part of the official psychology of Christendom. Despite its connection with a fabled " Fall," this notion of human nature lasted long because so obviously in consonance with the facts. The " law in our members warring against the law in our minds and bringing us into captivity to sin," we now know to be the " ape and tiger " liv- ing over into their distant relatives. But until Darwin there was no scientific explanation of the facts which the doctrine of inborn depravity sought to interpret.

Moral philosophers, on the other hand, from Mencius to Shaftesbury, from Zeno to Bishop Butler, and from Marcus Aurelius to Kant, shut their eyes to such facts. They hide with roses the abyss between the natural man and the man required in our complicated societies. They overlook the strain our social order puts on the natural instincts. They ignore the his- torical recency of many social requirements. Deriving the rule of right from the constitution of the mind, they find virtue con- formable to our nature and are able to convict Vhomrne moyen sensuel of being unnatural and foolish as well as wicked. In the early impulsive ages such ideas could have little influence on conduct. But since the rhythms of settled life, the regularity of social pursuits, and the iron routine of labor have made self- control common, these considerations which enlist the reflective self on the side of obedience acquire a high value for regulation.

A third idea is that actions fall naturally into two groups. In the first group, which comprises most human activities, the ground of choice is found in the nature of the consequences ; in the second group, called " conduct," the ground of choice is to be sought in the conscience or moral reason. As a matter of fact, the consequences of any act, as they are the natural criterion for judging it, constitute the natural sanction for doing or shunning it. This holds true even in that borderland where the paths of individuals intersect and their purposes are liable to clash. Here we have the complication that the doer of an act may reap the pleasant consequences of it while others reap its unpleasant con-