Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 2.djvu/369

 ABSTRA CT AND PRA CTICAL ETHICS 3 5 5

party or sectional action whatsoever. For is not every party and every opinion that has a name at all marked with the same one-sidedness ? Do not all the names by which leading schools of moralists and reformers are known conceal such abstractions as we have been speaking of ? Are not one set of abstractions indicated by individualist, conservative, moderate, another by socialist, liberal, progressive ? One set by realist, utilitarian, naturalist, another by idealist, mystic, supernaturalist ? And if this is so, will it not be safer for us to keep clear of them alto- gether, and refuse to call ourselves by any of them ?

The fact is undoubtedly true. These names strictly taken do conceal abstractions. But it is to be noted that the defect in question attaches not to names of schools of moralists and politicians alone, but to names of any kind. Logic, as we all know, divides names into concrete names and abstract names, but the truth is that all names are abstract. It is of the nature of names to be abstract, for they all indicate only one side or aspect of the thing they denote. If, therefore, we are going to wait till we can find a name which will express everything we are before we consent to call ourselves anything, we shall have to be content to remain nameless. The one-sidedness of a name is in reality no reason why we should refuse to call ourselves by it, if we find ourselves in general sympathy with the party which adopts it. It is, on the other hand, a very good reason why we should be on our guard against the one-sidedness of thought which the name suggests. The penalty that attaches to the neglect of this precaution illustrates a peculiar attribute of abstractions which has often been pointed out. I have already said that abstract ideas are impractical ideas. Circumstances are sure to defeat them. But this is not all. It requires to be added that they defeat themselves. For abstractions are a kind of extreme and like extremes they u ml to meet. It is impossible for me at this stage in my paper to illustrate this >erty of abstractions with any fullness. I may, however, in passing refer to a familiar example of it. We shall all admit that there is such a thing as extreme individualism. One of the