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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

155 happens less through rational discussion than by unconscious imitation. In a collective conviction ideas proper are always weaker than unreasoned images and associations. The cause of the excessive sensibility of an aggregate is also the cause of its feeble intelligence. The union of individuals also gives to each of them the feeling of great power, at the same time the feeling of responsibility is weakened. Aggregates are not inferior to individuals at every point As they destroy the sentiment of responsibility, they restrain the egoistic act Intensity of feeling is increased while intelligence is degraded by the union. In short, sociology has demonstrated that the society is different from the sum of its parts. Contemporary movements are democratic. All governments tend to come more and more under the influence of the people. Spencer holds that the organic conception requires democracy. The units of the organism are discrete and conscious. Society is not the end of the individual, but the individual the end of society. Coöperation is no longer forced, but voluntary. The progress of representative and elective government is a necessary consequence of the passage of the military form of society into the industrial. Tarde says the mechanism of imitation explains the democratic movement. Durkheim thinks the division of labor requires equality. The more labor is divided, the more individuals differ in functions of ideas. The solidarity is not mechanical but organic. The three agree that the evolution of society requires equal liberty, and what logically follows—general discussion and deliberation, and the power of the masses.

Thus sociology maintains the two theses: (1) The impotence of the popular intellect; (2) the all-powerfulness of the popular will. The force of large sentiments may well be preferred to the influence of narrow intelligence. Democracy has reason to be proud of its achievements. The development of the critical spirit is a manifestation of the liberty of thought. Thus the worst consequences of the first thesis are counteracted. Those who would choose between democratic means and ends, and, because the people are not capable of perceiving their true interests, guard them by diminishing their powers, would defeat their own purpose. It is impossible to pursue democratic ends and reject democratic means. Yet we are not able to reconcile the first and second theses.—( in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. January 1896. Paris: Armand Collin et Cie.)