Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 11.djvu/651

 SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION LINES 635

and he jumps up and down, and cries out, and says it smarts fear- fully, we infer that he feels as we felt when we were stung by such an insect, showed such symptoms, and acted in a similar way. This does not require a metaphysician. By similar comparison and inference are interpreted the signs of hope, fear, anger, love, cowardice, enthusiasm, greed, and benevolence that are intelligible to all who in themselves have known the like, without aid from any more mysterious means of communion than the most unmeta- physical sociologist admits.

We accept the analysis of "consciousness of kind" and "ejective" interpretation of others which seems to Dr. Fogel to imply metaphysical elements, but question whether that seeming would appear to one who had no predilection for discovery of metaphysical elements. We heartily agree with the statement that " understanding others by reading my own experience into them is indispensable; " n but what a leap to the conclusion that follows in the next sentences :

Consequently, to get at societary facts it is a necessary preliminary that the subject connect himself vitally with the world of his investigation, so that he feels himself a part of that world as having fellowship with it. And here we are beyond doubt in the world of appreciation, and so in the preserves of metaphysics.

Dr. Fogel also argues that "imitation" requires "apprecia- tion " as metaphysically conceived. But is it not enough for the imitator to see the outer act and its observable consequences ? To see the overt act affords the idea of the act, the ideo-motor sug- gestion which alone is essential to the simpler form of imitation. To see the act and its desirable objective consequences the nut cracked by the blow, the weight lifted by the lever is enough to afford the idea of the act as a means, and appeal to motives for intelligent imitation. To appreciate our own experience in situa- tions of a given sort is enough to afford motives to imitate one who creates such situations. For example, the applauded orator. Not only the simpler ideo-motor form of imitation, but also its higher forms, do not require that we metaphysically " appreciate " the experience of the person imitated by recognizing our " organic

11 Loc. cit., p. 371.