Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 10.djvu/153

 NOTES AND ABSTRACTS 14 1

given per cent, upon its capital stock. When the question arises whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional power in prescribing rates to be charged by a corporation controlling a public highway, stockholders are not the only persons whose rights or interests are to be considered." In 1898 the rule was laid down that the basis of calculations as to reasonable rates of a corporation " must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public." This statement, with others in the opinion, appears to limit " fair value '' to that of the physical property and to exclude franchise valuations.

Finally, a decision in 1901 still further limited state powers in the regulation of rates, laying down the principle that a state may not fix a maximum rate applicable only to businesses having a certain large amount of traffic. ALTON D. ADAMS, in Journal of Politico' Economy, December, 1903. E. B. W.

Principles of Municipal Organization. The government of American cities is generally admitted to be a conspicuous failure. Present efforts looking in the direction of bettering conditions make use of civic leagues and reform associations as extraneous, moral influences in counteracting what seems to be a normal tendency toward corruption. What is it in our municipal situation that gives rise to this pernicious " normal tendency " ? The cause must lie either ( i ) in a defect of character in the people, or (2) in a defect in the organization of government. In support of the first cause there is great weight of authority. The points usually urged are as follows : (a) Levity of character. This, however, is not borne out by our experience in the administration of other governmental institutions, nor by the success of municipal government in Canada, where the people are of very much the same character as our own. The second charge,

(b) lack of public spirit, is not sustained when we consider the achievements of public-spirited men in other directions than that of municipal government. Another defect of men, rather than of methods, which is sometimes urged, is

(c) the wickedness of local politicians. This seems to be hardly a sufficient explanation, especially in view of the fact that complete changes in the personnel of city government seldom produce more than temporary improvement. This failure, by the way, is probably due to the entire absence of control of methods by officials of a city a fact in marked contrast to conditions prevailing in busi- ness administration, where the achievement of a certain result is almost the only requirement, administration and method of control being alike left to the dis- cretion of the responsible official, (d) Commercialism is by many regarded as the secret of the condition of city governments. It would seem that the relation of trusteeship, when unsupported by self-interest, is often debauched by the commer- cial spirit, especially in situations where the details of transactions can be covered up and kept from general knowledge. In the evolution of strictly commercial enterprises, periods of notoriously fraudulent practices are, however, succeeded by a regularized and normal commercialism which gives little occasion for such conditions to arise. Compare, for example, the early and later management of railways. But in politics the curse persists. We must look further for the special solution of our problem, (e) Hard-headed business-men as well as party bosses are apt to regard the features of our municipal rule as incidental to democratic government as not ideal but necessary accompaniments of popular government. But again that the fault does not lie in the democratic character of our municipal government is proved by the eminent success of the decidedly more democratic municipal institutions of Great Britain. We may conclude that the charge that defect in the character of th'e people is the cause of our municipal conditions is unfounded.

To turn now to the hypothesis of a defect in the organization of government, we find that among the various and often peculiar forms of municipal government in this country and abroad, there exists only one generic difference between the type in the United States and that found elsewhere namely, that, whereas every- where else the legislative and executive departments of city government are connected, in the United States they are disconnected. The evils of the boss system seem to be coextensive with the limits of this peculiarly American practice of rendering independent of one another these two functions of government. The