Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 1.djvu/159

 Rh Moreover, the laws of science and those of art cannot have the same form, since the former only demonstrate, while the latter prescribe. To give concrete examples, the following is a scientific law, because it is the simple identification of a fact; viz., that man always seeks to attain a maximum of result with a minimum of effort. In the proper domain of political economy there are scientific laws, such as the law of supply and demand (goods are always dearer when the demand is great and the supply small); such as Gresham's law (bad money drives out the good); such as the law of Jean-Baptiste Say (products always find a market easiest when they are most abundant and most varied); such as the law of Ricardo (the rent of land tends to constant increase); such as the law of Malthus (population tends to increase in geometrical progression, food in arithmetical). Again there is, on the other hand, a law of art; such, for example, as the well-known law of morals: "do to others as you would that they should do to you;" or the precept of Kant: "treat man as an end not as a means;" or the maxim of the : "lasssez faire, laissez passer." The laws of science and those of art may bear upon the same subject-matter. It is most desirable indeed that upon all social questions accumulated observation shall at last be transformed into scientific laws from which precepts of art may then be immediately derived.

For example, if constant and uninterrupted experience should demonstrate that the application of free-trade measures is every where followed by improvement in general welfare, this would then become a scientific law. From it we might draw without hesitation a precept of art, viz., that free trade should every where be adopted. But even here, in accordance with this hypothesis which I have purposely made as favorable as possible to the reconciliation of science and art, there will always remain between them this difference, that the one is limited to discourse of that which is and has been; while the other may