Page:American Journal of Psychology Volume 21.djvu/454

422 No experiments were made upon the imagery of touch.

No. of Obs. Memory Imagination Imagery Percentage of Memory and Movement Percentage of Imagination and No Movement 572 709 Visual 89.5 79.5 155 214 Auditory 84 91 56 57 Olfactory 96 80

It would be hasty to conclude, from the foregoing Experiments, that the imaginative consciousness is constituted as such by a typical distribution and proportion of kinæsthetic elements, and by this alone. Emphasis has been laid, in many quarters, upon the affective component in imagination, and it is necessary that the affective theory be brought to the test of experiment.

We thought, at first, of having recourse to the method of expression. But we gave up this idea: partly on account of the perplexity in which the method is itself involved, partly because we did not see how, at its best, it could help towards a solution of our problem. The questions at issue are whether there is a qualitatively characteristic mood which informs consciousness in memory and in imagination, and whether—granted that the moods exist—the imaginative consciousness is more strongly, more markedly affective than the memorial. We knew from Experiment VII that the word method could bring out reports of mood, and we accordingly adopted it, though in slightly modified form, in the present case.

Experiment X. We selected two observers who had vivid visual imagery: Miss de Vries, of whom we have already spoken, and Dr. Pyle, an assistant in the laboratory. Both observers were familiar with the standard investigations of mental imagery; and both had had practice in this field of observation. The new experiments were made in diffuse daylight: the observers sat at about 1.5 m. from a buff-colored blank wall; their eyes were open, but fixation was not prescribed. The general instruction was that they should report upon the mood accompanying or infusing their images; and that (if this procedure were of any help to them) they should