Page:American Journal of Psychology Volume 21.djvu/171

Rh (f) It will not be inappropriate to consider under a special heading the reports of certain observers who were distinguished from the rest through taking what we may call a subjective attitude towards the arguments, or perhaps 'personal attitude' would describe it better. In most of these cases there was probably recognition of the fallacy, in some sort of terms, but the unpleasantness attached either to the thought of the observer herself as being the subject of an attempt to deceive, or to the imaginary propounder of the argument. In the case of (1), three persons described their attitude as one of 'irritation' at the maker of the argument; one said she felt 'scorn,' another confessed to a 'pugilistic impulse,' and still another declared the author of the syllogism to be "beyond the reach of argument." Three, on the other hand, felt wounded self-esteem, a 'sense of being deceived.' These experiences were mentioned in the case of the other arguments also. They show how close the connection may be between intellectual processes and the fighting instinct.

(g) Three observers gave their general dislike of formal arguments as the chief reason for finding the syllogisms unpleasant.

We must also take into account those observers who found the arguments either wholly or partly pleasant, and those who experienced no reaction at all. The percentage of observers finding the syllogisms wholly agreeable was for (1), seven; for (2) twelve; for (3), ten; for (4), twelve, and for (5), nine. The percentage of observers finding the arguments partly pleasant and partly unpleasant was, for (i), eleven; for (2), three; for (3) six; for (4), five, and for (5), four. The percentage of those finding the arguments neither agreeable nor disagreeable was for (i), ten; for (2), fourteen; for (3), eighteen; for (4), twenty, and for (5), seventeen.

What were the sources of pleasantness? In a few scattered instances they were found in the content of the ideas suggested, as when one observer declared that she found (2) pleasant because it was agreeable to think of virtuous people making profitable use of their time. But the principal sources were (a) thinking the syllogism correct, which was done by ten per cent, of the observers in the case of (4), by two per cent, in the case of (i), and by two per cent, in the case of (3); (b) amusement, which was felt by from one to six per cent, of the observers in the case of every argument, and (c) the enjoyment of tracing and correcting the fallacy, which from two to four per cent, reported with all the arguments. The comparatively large number of persons who thought the fourth syllogism correct may perhaps be accounted for by the unfamilar character of its subject-matter, which very likely obscured the logical processes involved. No special discussion of these sources of pleasantness seems justified by the data at our command. And if, in general our discussion and analysis of the experiences of our observers appears to be far from thorough, our excuse must lie in the fact that their introspective records were not full enough to warrant us in interpreting the results further. If the observers had been trained in introspection we should have gained much, but we should have also lost something, in that our subjects would have been alike less numerous and less naïve. –11