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 6o4 Reviews of Books and carry the bridge, now known as Burnside Bridge, early in the day. General Cox shows that orders were not given to make the attack until nearly or quite ten o'clock, and that the movement was promptly made. He exonerates Burnside from all blame and puts the responsibility for the failure to destroy Lee's army upon McClellan, who, under malign influ- ences at and near headquarters, had reduced Sumner and Burnside from their proper rank as wing commanders and thrown the army corps into such relation with each other that unity of action was impossible and de- feat invited. The chapter on " McClellan and Politics " is a new and deeply in- teresting analysis. It is natural that in treating of General Burnside's command of the Department of the Ohio, and the movement into East Tennessee, General Cox, who had prominent part therein, should attempt at much length to defend his chief for not obeying Lincoln's and Stan- ton's oft-repeated orders to join Rosecrans before the battle of Chicka- mauga. This effort will not stand the test of the record, especially when it has become known since the war that General "Sam" Jones, who succeeded by his active demonstrations in holding Burnside back, had only 1500 effective men that could easily have been taken care of with two brigades. In the discussion of the East Tennessee campaign, with which the first volume closes, severe and unwarranted criticisms of General Rose- crans begin, leading up to a version in the second volume of his relief after Chickamauga (related to General Cox by General Garfield, and undoubtedly reported correctly), which will oblige Army of the Cumber- land men to tell the full inside history of that affair, which hitherto has been known to a very small circle. This opening chapter of the second volume is painful reading for the veterans who served under General Rosecrans. Those who know the real facts will feel compelled by this long and specific statement of Gen- eral Cox to disclose them. But they can only be indicated in this brief review. Stated concisely, they are almost the exact opposite of the present narrative. Instead of General Rosecrans being unnerved and dejected when, after riding clear of the break, the general and his staff halted to consider the situation, he was clear in his orders which he re- quested General (iarfield to give in the immediate rear, and at Chatta- nooga, while he himself should ride back to Thomas. Garfield per- sistently argued that these were matters that General Rosecrans, the su- preme authority, should properly and more efficiently attend to, while he, Garfield, would ride to Thomas. To this Rosecrans yielded. Gar- field's ride was by a detour of eight miles, when the direct road of only two miles was clear of the enemy. Immediately after the battle, and while still chief-of-staff, he wrote Secretary Chase a letter, which has never yet been printed, severely criticizing his chief for going to Chatta- nooga and otherwise unjustly attacking him. Mr. Chase took the letter to Mr. Lincoln who read it to the Cabinet. It was the direct cause of General Rosecrans's removal. These are the mildest features of the full