Page:American Historical Review, Volume 12.djvu/677

 Pajillin : The Navy of the Americmi Revolution 667 not chiefly concerned with doings at sea, details of fights, and move- ments of armed vessels, but seeks rather to tell us of the naval adminis- trative machinery of the Revolution — the origin, organization, and work of naval committees, secretaries of marine, navy boards, and naval agents. The creation of the American navy was not merely a nail- ing and matching of boards and making of sails, but the creating after older models of an entirely new body of laws and regulations. Any sort of an attempt in this review to outline that legislation as described by Mr. Paullin would be inadequate. In addition to this there is a brief summary of legislation with reference to prize-courts and privateering. The emphasis has been placed upon the naval policy of the administra- tors, with a description of the various classes of naval movements, show- ing the total result, with details only in the case of a few typical cruises and fights. In this effort the dramatic quality of the exploit has not been allowed to fix the amount of detail used, and Paul Jones gets his due, while other, neglected, officers are given a more suitable mention than older historians have given them. The result is a much better balanced narrative, and a unity utterly lacking in older treatments. As dramatic historical literature the book suffers, but as a scientific study of an institution its value is vastly enhanced. Perhaps the most instructive chapter in the book is that on " The Conditions of the Continental Naval Service ". Not only in New Eng- land, but in the Middle and Southern colonies also, commerce and ship- building were important industries. Indeed Virginia during the Revo- lution put more naval ships afloat than any other colony. In spite of these maritime interests, it was the lack of sailors that constituted the chief obstacle to the success of the Continental navy. It was forced to spend most of its days in port vainly trying to enlist seamen. Much of this was due to the seductive allurements of privateering. Priva- teersmen paid higher wages than either Congress or the states, and. moreover, the business was often so lawless as to have all the excite- ment and profit of piracy. Not a few of the failures of the Continental navy, writes Mr. Paullin, are to be laid at the door of the Yankee priva- teersman. Nevertheless these hardy fellows supplied a large part of the sinews of war to both army and navy, though they made Congress pay a good round price. The most original portion of the book is that part (162 pages) dealing with the state navies. Massachusetts had a fleet of sixteen armed vessels. Virginia had about fifty vessels, but poorly equipped. Nine of the states had such navies, but of this total ferce only about sixty vessels were adapted to deep-sea navigation. These might have aided Congress's Marine Committee, but expeditions concerted with them proved disappointing. Subordination could not be obtained. " The commander of a state vessel or the master of a privateer, for aught either could see. subtended as large an angle in maritime affairs, as an officer of Congress, which body was to them nebulous, uncertain, and irresolute" (p. 153). A special chapter is devoted to the navies