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Rh The author expresses his belief that it would be well if the legislature were empowered to require the opinion of the court of appeals upon the validity of pending bills. And he considers that opinions thus obtained would be binding in later litigation (I. 747), a very doubtful proposition. The experience of other states does not recommend such a constitutional provision. And such opinions, where necessarily the courts are without the aid of argument by counsel interested upon both sides of the question, are rarely as sound as those made in the usual course of litigation. The opinions of the supreme courts of South Dakota and Colorado (Re Constitutional Provision, 3 S. D. 548, 54 N. W. Rep. 650; Re Chapter 6 Session Laws of 1890, 8 S. D. 274, 66 N. W. 310; In re Irrigation Resolution, 9 Col. 620. 21 Pac. Rep. 478) may be upon this point profitably consulted. In 1872 Governor Hoffman asked the chief judge and judges of the court of appeals to express their opinion on the constitutionality of a bill then before him. Chief Judge Church and his associates promptly replied with an opinion worthy of Jack Bunsby, stating that they all agreed that " serious questions might arise upon the bill in its present form " as to such points. The bill was thereupon vetoed by the governor (Public Papers of John T. Hoffman, 1869-1872, pp. 336-339). It does not seem that the court strengthened its hold upon the public confidence by giving this extra-judicial opinion. In 1890, when Governor Hill suggested to the Republican legislature a "joint submission of the constitutional questions involved" (in controversy over a certain bill) "to the consideration of the Court of Appeals" (Public Papers of David B. Hill, 1890, pp. 75. 79), the two houses did not accept this suggestion, and the bill was vetoed.

Although some of the complaints against the old Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors are quoted, there is no reference to any of its decisions that were plainly based upon political affiliations (Franklin v. Osgood, 14 Johnson 327; Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johnson 391; Hammond's Political History. I. 492, 547). Judge Potter's attachment against a member of the assembly and the subsequent proceedings of that house are fully described. There is no mention, however, of the injunction issued by the late Jacob A. Clute, when County Judge of Albany, at the suit of John McCarthy, forbidding the clerk of the senate from performing certain acts relative to the roll. The reports of the judiciary committee of the senate upon the case contain interesting material concerning the power of the lieutenant-governor as president of the senate, the authority of that house to punish for contempt, and the freedom of the senate from interference by the courts (Sen. Doc. 1894, Nos. 71, 72). There is no account of the litigation by the state to recover the money misappropriated by the Tweed Ring from the treasury of the city and county of New York (People V. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. i ; People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491 ; People V. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202). The descriptions of the impeachments and proceedings for the removal of judges and other public officers contain