Page:American Historical Review, Volume 12.djvu/394

384 had been taught; of the criticisms of Moltke's Bohemian campaign he remarks, "Il est vain ensuite et puéril de s'inscrire en faux centre le succès" (p. 338).

We must refrain from following these writers into any of the many disputed episodes of these critical years. But it is difficult to refrain from comparing them with regard to that culminating and much-disputed event, the outbreak of war between France and Prussia. And the net result of the comparison is perhaps to show how near together have come the more enlightened minds. After stating clearly the conflicting national views, Zwiedineck-Südenhorst declares that "kann man doch mit voller Bestimmtheit aussprechen, dass weder die volkstümliche franzöische, noch die volkstümliche deutsche Anschauung richtig ist. Jede von ihnen leidet an innerer Unwahrheit" (p. 431). While there was a French court party desirous of war, the emperor remained convinced of the Prussian military superiority; while Bismarck had at first welcomed and worked for the Hohenzollern candidacy as likely to improve the Prussian position, he did not aim to bring on war thus with France, did not expect it to be thus brought on, and was not the leading spirit in the last phase of it; the sensitiveness of the French and the weakness of the emperor produced the war-situation, and when in the situation a final controlling opportunity fell to Bismarck, "er hat den Krieg gemacht …; er hat aus den Falten der Toga, in die sich die preussische Regierung nach den Emser Vorgängen hüllen konnte, die Kriegsfalte fallen lassen" (p. 445), publishing the news from Ems in such a form as in view of the national feeling in both countries would be sure to precipitate the war. Denis on his part acknowledges to the full the mistakes of the French government, but denies that Napoleon in the years 1867-1870 was steadily trying to form a war-coalition against Prussia. "En dernère analyse", he says (p. 458), "si Bismarck rechercha la rupture, il y fut en quelque sorte contraint par le gouvernement franqais qui s'obstinait à se mettre en travers de sa route, tandis que l'Empereur qui redoutait la guerre, la rendit inévitable en se refusant à accepter les conditions sans lesquelles une entente durable était impossible." Bismarck, believing the war inevitable, deliberately brought it about through the Hohenzollern candidacy (which however he did not regard as making it certain), and it would have required great coolness and good sense on the part of the French government to keep the French people "de se jeter tête baissée dans le piège qui lui était tendu" (p. 459). If Bismarck had had his way, the matter would have been so managed by stealing a march on France that if war resulted Prussia would have had Spain as an ally; on the failure of this it is the mismanagement of the French government that brings the affair to such a pass as to make it again the best of occasions for the war, and Bismarck then again seizes upon the situation and purposely makes peace impossible through the brutal ultimatum form that he gives the Ems telegram.