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 Literature of the South African U ar 317 to the enemy positions which would have rendered prolonged d.e- fense impossible. Yet the writers of this volume have evidently no particular animus against the defender of Ladysmith. On the whole perhaps they treat him with more fairness than other leaders, but they pose too much as frank and candid critics of the British army, assuming as the foundation of their criticism that our diffi- culties in South Africa during the war of 1 899-1 900 were entirely due to the imperfect training of the troops and the incapacity of their commanders. The assumption is untrue and, being untrue, has led to a false standard of criticism and to the painting of a false picture. That the British army had much to learn in South Africa, and that many mistakes were made, every member of it will admit ; but this admission must equally be made in every campaign by every army. The real cause of the gravity of the situation in Natal and Cape Colony in the last quarters of 1899 was the fact that the British government had allowed its diplomacy to outstrip its prepar- ation for war. The twin sisters strategy and policy were not mov- ing forward hand in hand, and their separation left British generals to face in the field an enemy not merely superior in numbers, a matter which could have been regarded with equanimity, but greatly superior in mobility and in knowledge of the country. This, and not the imperfections of officers and men, is the true governing factor of the whole of the first phase of the South African War. In failing to realize its importance the Times historian has placed that phase in a false focus, and thus distorted the reader's apprecia- tion of its lessons. The same error, though in another form, appears in the third volume, notwithstanding its historical value as a narrative of facts. It is tinged throughout with the Carthaginian tradition of crucifying the unsuccessful general. Its criticisms are in the main sound. Indeed there are grounds for believing that they are based on opinions of a body of experts held in respect by soldiers through- out the civilized world. The marked similarity between the general conclusions set forth in the Times History as to the operations on the Tugela and the events of Lord Roberts's march on Bloemfontein and those which appeared later in the account issued by the Ger- man General Staff is very noticeable, and, if rumor be correct, is not due to any mere accidental coincidence in opinion. The Berlin narrative calls attention to the imperfections in staff work in both the eastern and the western theatres of war ; it condemns in clear language the desire to find a new way to victory without shedding of blood, which marked Sir Redvers Buller's battles on the Tugela