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Rh forced out of office. These strong measures of Lord Ii added fuel to the flames of opposition.

Then Manabe sought the imperial approval of the treaties. It must now be noted that the approval simply had to be gained. The Shogunate was no longer confident of its influence, it could no longer overawe the court. It was forced, therefore, to recede from its former wise position that the exclusion laws should be annulled for the best interests of Japan, and so fell back to the equivocal view that the treaties were but temporary evils which could not be avoided, that the Shogunate did not desire to cultivate friendly relations with the foreign powers, and that as soon as adequate armaments were prepared the barbarians would be expelled. This was a very different argument from that advanced by Lord Hotta only a few months before. It was no easy matter to secure the Mikado's endorsement of even this temporary measure; but finally, after three months of discussion, on February 2, 1859, the imperial answer was delivered. This took the form of approving the resolution of the Shogun, the tairo, and the roju to keep the barbarians at a distance and eventually restore the old policy of seclusion, and authorized the Shogun to take temporary measures to this end.

This effort to secure the Mikado's approval of the treaties, covering a full year, indicates clearly the weakening of the Shogun's influence and the corresponding increase in the court's prestige. The change was further shown by the elation of the Shogunate at the conditional approval at length gained. Lord Ii, however, fully recognized the inherent weakness of such a sanction and worked strenuously for another year, and until his assassination, to improve the relations between the court and the Castle and thus gain an unqualified endorsement of the Shogun's foreign policy. The commercial treaties, therefore, had been negotiated without the imperial approval, and the enlarged foreign relations then inaugurated were agreed to be but temporary. Hence the anti-Shogun, anti-foreign factions had ammunition close at hand. With increasing insistence they demanded that the period of temporary intercourse be brought to a close and that the loyal patriots unite to drive the barbarians into the sea. The Shogunate, during the next six years, had to pursue a temporizing policy. Convinced that foreign relations were absolutely necessary and eminently wise, it tried to live up to the treaties on the one hand, and to quiet the dangerous domestic opposition on the other. Hence its position was unenvia-