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342 it not only would not be unfortunate, but on the contrary very fortunate, and that certainly it would not be I that would be troubled by it. The disinterestedness that I profess in regard to Constantinople and the Straits would not be at all modified thereby. As for France, I believe that the fear of seeing us eat up that country has had time to evaporate. We should never be such fools as to commence a war that could bring us nothing.

Then taking up, after some moments of reflection, the chapter of hypotheses as to the future, he went on:

Count Shuvalov observed to the chancellor that the secret treaty defined, in a decisive and unmistakable manner, the point of view of Russia in respect to France; that it was precisely the case of attack that it provided for, and that the integrity of the French territory was an essential condition of the maintenance of the balance in Europe. Prince Bismarck on his part declared that the secret treaty, in his opinion, corresponded so exactly to the situation which the two contracting parties had both desired to create, that even to define its duration would be, strictly speaking, unnecessary, the text of the agreement being, so to speak, the expression of a fixed and unchanging situation.

Count Shuvalov ended his despatch by concluding that the chancellor would ask nothing better than to renew our reciprocal engagements, and the tsar minuted at the end the following words: "I think, in effect, that to Bismarck our entente is in some sort a guarantee that no written agreement exists between us and France, and that is very important for Germany".

After an absence of some weeks, Shuvalov on March 5/17 called on the chancellor at the latter's invitation. He found him in a state of great excitement, for the resignation of the prince and of