Page:American Historical Review, Vol. 23.djvu/347

Rh Was it our fault if we had more enemies than Germany, which had but one? Could we bind ourselves, in respect to Austria and especially in respect to Turkey, to remain impassive in the face of every threat, perhaps even that of having the hostility of Germany in case we should see ourselves obliged to act in a direction which she might judge to be aggressive?

Shuvalov refused to follow the chancellor into this discussion. He had been instructed to propose to the court of Berlin a dual arrangement. He knew the ideas of the emperor and of M. de Giers, both of whom looked upon the neutrality of Russia in a war between Germany and France as the equivalent for the reservations which the chancellor made toward us by reason of Germany's obligations toward Austria-Hungary. Moreover, a convention between Germany and Russia without reservations as to the possibility of a dismemberment would have been more than unpopular among us; it was impossible to ignore the disturbed state of Russian public opinion since the treaty of Berlin, which, rightly or wrongly, was regarded as having deprived us of all the advantages which we had attained at so great a cost.

At a loss for further arguments, Shuvalov confessed his inferiority, saying:

Bismarck took pity on his interlocutor. He collected himself and, after a few moments of reflection, dictated to Shuvalov this form of reservation of article I.: "This provision shall not apply to Austria and to France save in the case that one of the high contracting parties shall be attacked either by Austria or by France".

In the next interview, Bismarck proposed the following language: "This provision shall not apply to a war against Austria or France resulting from an attack made on one of those two powers Rh