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332 France as for all Europe. M. de Mohrenheim was to convey these views to Flourens, assuring him that an entente between France and Russia would certainly embitter relations between Germany and France.

The government of the Republic was entirely aware of the cogent reasons in favor of a good understanding between Russia and Germany, and accepted the view that Bismarck, if secure of good relations with Russia, would exert all his efforts to assure to the empire he had created a peaceful development. Eminently desirous to please the Russian ambassador and to defer to his advice, the French cabinet sought a sure means of consulting the imperial cabinet in great secrecy, through a confidential person, sent for that special purpose. The tsar minuted upon Mohrenheim's telegram on this subject the words, "This might be very useful to us, in certain contingencies [à un moment donné], and we ought not to discourage them". The person chosen for the purpose was. But Baron Mohrenheim did not deem it necessary at that time to have recourse to this intermediary.

In the course of that same year the secret treaty of the three emperors was to expire. The triple agreement was the basis of the ministerial policy of Giers. Voices were raised in Russia in criticism of it, and in denunciation of it as harmful to Russian interests. Several diplomats, such as Count Ignatiev, Saburov, Tatishchev, and others, won over to their side the publicist Katkov, who undertook a bitter campaign against the minister of foreign affairs. Giers nevertheless was able to obtain the emperor's approval. In a letter of November, 1886, to Count Shuvalov, ambassador in Berlin, he wrote that his Majesty continued to attach value to the understanding with Germany, but that the emperor wished that it should be serious, sincere, and complete. On his part Shuvalov, while appreciating the traditional friendship of the courts of Prussia and Russia and the advantages which our country might derive from it, observed that one did not need to be a great politician to convince himself of the immense profit it was to Germany to be united to us in a strong and durable manner, for the assurances of support, or rather of neutrality, with respect to Bulgaria, which Germany bestowed upon us in abundant measure, cost her very little. In spite of all the outcries in the delegations at Pesth, the Berlin cabinet knew very well that Austria would not dare to undertake anything against us, that she would not go beyond platonic protestations. Germany risked nothing in declaring to us that Austria could not reckon upon her aid nor even upon her moral support. But was it not necessary to