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326 The other high officials who took part in the deliberations,, , , while recognizing the force of Saburov's comments, were of the opinion that Bismarck would never consent to the modifications which he proposed.

In a memoir dated in December, 1883,, first counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, set forth the arguments for renewing the treaty of 1881 for three years, without any modifications. In his view the programme worked out at Livadia in 1879 was a preparation for arriving at our sole objective—Constantinople and the Straits—by the following means: (1) the restoration of financial equilibrium by the retiring of fifty million rubles of banknotes per annum; (2) the creation of a fleet in the Black Sea; (3) an understanding with our neighbors to make sure of their neutrality. Now as notes to the amount of more than four hundred millions of rubles had been emitted for the last war, we should, if we retired fifty millions per annum, need eight or ten years to reestablish our currency. The creation of an adequate fleet would call for still more time. The result would be that if we should at this time conclude an arrangement with Germany based on a full liberty of action toward France on her part, in exchange for a full liberty of action on our part at Constantinople and in the Dardanelles, Germany would be obtaining an immediate advantage and would be giving us nothing more than an assurance which we could realize only at the end of some fifteen years. It was beyond all question that as soon. as Bismarck had assured himself of our neutrality, he would seize the first occasion to finish with France. Without sufficient funds for war and without a fleet, should we be able at that same time to finish with Constantinople and the Straits, in face of England's opposition? And if we could not do it simultaneously, could we reckon upon it that Germany, freed from all fear on the side of France and become all-powerful in Europe, would at any later time aid us in good faith to realize our Oriental programme? If on the other hand we contented ourselves with renewing our arrangements for three years, we should be gaining time, indispensable for our preparations, and we should be fortifying the status quo, because Germany, reassured for the moment, would have less reason to precipitate a decisive conflict with France, on which the Emperor William would probably not resolve except in case of absolute necessity; because France, knowing that she could not count on us, would be less disposed to embark upon the terrible adventure of revanche; and finally because, since the triple entente was based on the maintenance of the Treaty of Berlin, the joint action of the