Page:American Historical Review, Vol. 23.djvu/172

162 and the War of 1870–1871, at which time "the alleged perfection of Germany's arrangements … is merely one of the fictions of history"; that the effective application of French effort in this direction followed the disastrous results of the Franco-Prussian War; and that the beginning of England's preparation "was the direct outcome of the conditions of semi-panic" developed there in 1859 by the prospect of an early French invasion.

Two chapters deal with the building and control of so-called "economic-political-strategical" railways, as a means of conquest, without the necessary accompaniment of war. The first describes the development of German strategical railways in Southwest Africa, directly as a means of dominating British South Africa, and ultimately for the purpose of transforming the whole of Africa into a German-African Empire, "possibly more valuable and more brilliant than even the Indian Empire". The second of these chapters describes the German designs on Asiatic Turkey, through the instrumentality of the Bagdad Railway, "designed to ensure the establishment of a German Middle-Asian Empire, bringing under German control the entire region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and providing convenient stepping-off places from which an advance might be made on Egypt in the one direction and India in the other". These two chapters are among the most interesting in the book, but they deal too largely with political rather than military matters. They involve primarily questions of German aspiration in the field of Weltpolitik. National motives and national ambitions are analyzed and appraised. While the author's conclusions are based on authentic data and are not in disagreement with dominant opinion at the present time, all of the pertinent evidence will not become available until the veil is lifted at the end of the World War. This task must be left for the future historian.

The subject-matter of the book, in so far as it is limited to the rise of rail-power for direct military purposes, may logically be treated from three distinct aspects: the military functions of rail-power; the organization essential for effective performance of these functions; and the historical development of both the functions and organization of rail-power at various times and places since this "new factor" in warfare was recognized. From such an analysis, it is believed, would emerge a more distinct picture of the nature and significance of the railroad as an element in modern warfare than can be gathered from the author's uniform and largely exclusive adoption of the historical method. And if it be urged that the author's task was primarily an historical one, answer may still be made that a preliminary and distinct analysis of the problems of function and organization would make more vital and intelligible the exposition of historical development. The present treatment is unduly discursive, and in parts fragmentary. While the general presentation is comprehensive and accurate, the material is insufficiently digested and co-ordinated. As a result, the reader's im-