Page:America's Highways 1776–1976.djvu/475



Progress in the designation of the routes on the System had been slow. So was progress in construction. Congress authorized a sizable postwar Federal-aid highway program, but for the fiscal years 1946–53 no specific amounts were earmarked for the Interstate System.

In what now seems a token gesture, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1952 did authorize $25 million for the Interstate System for each of the fiscal years 1954 and 1955, to be matched on the traditional 50–50 Federal-State cost sharing basis. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954 authorized $175 million for the Interstate for each of the fiscal years 1956 and 1957, with the matching ratio changed to a 60-percent Federal share. These 1954–57 funds were apportioned among the States by formulas used for apportioning regular Primary System funds, taking into account the area, population, and postal route mileage in each State.

During the first postwar decade, of course, a good deal of the regular Federal-aid highway funds were used on the Interstate System—some 27 percent of the Primary and 45 percent of the Urban Federal-aid funds authorized for fiscal years 1946–56—however, this level of construction funding fell far short of meeting System traffic requirements or design standards.

Although some work progressed, traffic needs on the System increased at a faster rate than construction. The Congress, in 1948, requested PRA to study the status of the System and to comment on the relation of highways to the national defense. The ensuing study, made in cooperation with the State highway departments, was reported to Congress in 1949 in the document Highway Needs of the National Defense. It demonstrated the critical deficiencies of the Interstate routes and estimated the cost of needed improvements at $11.3 billion; 47 percent of the suggested improvements lay in urban areas.

There were some recognized deficiencies in the estimate. It did not include the 2,300 miles of urban auxiliary routes, which were then yet to be designated. It was realized that designs should be based on traffic needs of the future, but it was found impracticable to make such forecasts, so deficiencies of existing highways were measured against existing traffic.

There were other flaws, easily seen in hindsight. It was then considered that a good deal of the System could be developed by reconstruction of or widening existing highways, which later proved impractical on many route segments. And subsequent substantial construction price increases were unanticipated.

The next few years brought a welter of discussion and studies of the problem. Protracted hearings of the Subcommittee on Roads of the House of Representatives in 1953, published as the National Highway Study, dwelt at length on the Interstate System among other subjects.

In a message sent to the Governors Conference on July 12, 1954, President Eisenhower called for “a grand plan for a properly articulated highway system.” Later in 1954, a committee of the Governors Conference reported to the President its belief that the national government should assume primary responsibility, with State participation, for financing the Interstate System.

In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954, Congress requested the Bureau of Public Roads to make several extensive studies, in each of which the State highway departments collaborated.

One study was reported in March 1955 in the document Needs of the Highway Systems, 1955–84. Construction needs of the 37,700-mile Interstate System for the years 1955–64, to provide for traffic predicted for 1974, were estimated to cost $23.2 billion, of which 46 percent would be spent in urban areas. Again, the estimate did not cover the 2,300 miles of urban auxiliary routes. Thus, the estimate included essentially the same mileage as the estimate reported in 1949, and at about the same construction unit price levels.

Yet the new cost estimate was double that reported in 1949. This time an attempt was made to forecast future traffic needs; higher standards were used for estimate purposes, including access control throughout; and there was greater awareness of the probable need for extensive location on new right-of-way.

Still, the report itself acknowledged that there was a tendency in State estimates to reflect financial limitations rather than anticipated needs, and additionally a tendency to understate the needs. Further, both this and the earlier estimates were made in a comparatively short time, with limited manpower. A good deal of the estimating was done by map study for route location and use of average quantities and costs per mile.

Another study requested by Congress in 1954 was reported in April 1955 in the document Progress and Feasibility of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-Aid Program. At that time the toll turnpike was vigorously advocated by various promotional groups as the ready solution to highway congestion and financing. This study indicated that 6,700 miles of routes could be successfully financed by tolls, but predicted (reliably) that assurance of public funds for early completion of the Interstate System would soon end widespread interest in toll roads.

The report reaffirmed the desirability of the principle established in the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916: Roads built with Federal aid should be toll free. But the report did recommend inclusion in the Interstate System of toll roads which met System standards where there were reasonably satisfactory free roads in the corridor permitting traffic to bypass the toll road. This simply recognized that toll roads, built without Federal aid, existed on the lines of the Interstate System and that to duplicate them would be an economic waste.

Following up on his message to the Governors Conference in 1954, President Eisenhower appointed an Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program, with General Lucius D. Clay as its chairman. The 469