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 that “The Secretary of Agriculture shall approve only such projects as may be substantial in character.” To these critics MacDonald replied:

"In interpreting the word ‘substantial’ the Secretary has taken cognizance of the fact that an improvement which is substantial for one density and kind of traffic may not be substantial for another. It has been recognized that the types of roads which it is desirable to construct in New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania are not suitable or necessary for Nevada, Idaho, and the Dakotas . . . the decision as to the type of road which the Secretary will approve for a given locality has been based in every case upon the traffic which is using the existing road and which it is estimated will use the improved road . . . The result is that the Secretary has approved roads of all types and widths, from graded earth roads to concrete, brick, or bituminous concrete, narrow as well as wide; but the essential point is that in each case the decision has been based upon the best engineering judgment of the Federal Government and the several State highway departments, which between them employ the most highly capable highway engineers in the country."

The 1916 Act permitted spending Federal-aid funds on practically any rural post road. Director Page and, later, Chief MacDonald tried to focus the aid on the main intercity and intercounty roads, but inevitably, because of the realities of local politics, a number of roads of only local importance were improved. These failed to pass the test for inclusion in the 7 percent system, but the States, under their contracts with the Government, were still obliged to maintain them. To relieve the States of this burden, the Government permitted them to pay back the Federal share of the cost of these roads and then turn them back to the counties for maintenance. This process began in 1924 and by 1933, 1,526 miles had been relinquished.

Stage construction was little used by the eastern and northern States. Their federal-aid mileage was already largely improved with dustless pavement, thousands of miles of which had been severely damaged by trucking during the war. Their problem was to reinforce their roads to carry heavy motor trucks, and for this they chose concrete or brick pavements, not only because of their generally excellent service during the war, but also because they were considered “permanent” and, therefore, suitable for bond financing. With a few notable exceptions, these costly new pavements were laid within the existing rights-of-way, and, thus, perpetuated the faults of poor alinement and grade that existed in the old roads.

Within 5 years of the debacles of 1920 and 1921, the States had increased their capacity for roadbuilding to the point where they were able to obligate $100 million of Federal aid per year. By 1929 they had improved 90 percent of the Federal-aid system, or about 170,000 miles, to some degree, at least, by adequate grading and drainage. A little less than half of this mileage, some 79,000 miles, was improved with Federal aid and State matching funds; the rest with State and local funds alone.

This record was made possible not only by improved organization and management, but also by a rapid increase in the highway revenues of all the States. The increase was accompanied by a shifting of much of the highway tax burden from real property to the road user.

In 1921 there were 10.5 million motor vehicles registered in the United States, and the owners of these vehicles paid $122.5 million to the States in road-user taxes. This was about one-third of the total State expenditures for construction. The rest came from Federal aid and general State revenues.

With more and more cars being sold, the automotive industry favorably affected the national economy by requiring more materials and services for the traveler and his car. 114