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 per mile to build in 1912 were destroyed so completely that the State estimated it would cost $32,000 per mile to repair them at inflated 1918 costs. In New Jersey the “heavy truck would break through the crust, and immediately upon being extricated would be followed by others, until there was formed a veritable quagmire.”

Supposedly higher types of pavement, such as cement concrete and brick on concrete bases, also failed, principally because the extremely thin 4-inch and 5-inch slabs failed to bridge the soft spots in the subgrade. However, in Wayne County, Michigan, which for a number of years had been using progressively thicker concrete pavements, 8- and 9-inch slabs stood up remarkably well under some of the heaviest trucking in the Nation.

In normal times the States and counties would have closed their roads to save them from destruction, but in time of war this was unthinkable. It was also impracticable to force the truckers to lighten their loads enough to provide any real relief. The highway departments handled the emergency as best they could. Those that were able to get railroad cars hauled in immense quantities of stone and gravel. Others, such as Massachusetts, used nearby supplies of poor quality gravel and soft stone rather than wait for railroad cars to haul in better materials: "While the roads would not wear as long, we felt that in these times as this work could be done without closing them so they could still be used by the traffic, and as four carloads of bitumen would be sufficient to construct a mile of road which would require 40 carloads of cement or from 70 to 80 carloads of imported stone or gravel, that this would save rail shipments and thereby help the general traffic situation."

In this emergency the States, despite the AASHO priority road program, were still having difficulties getting railroad cars, asphalt and road materials for maintenance. To get things moving faster, the Secretary of Agriculture, at Director Page’s suggestion, invited the Army, the War Production Board, the Fuel Administration, the Railroad Administration, and the Capital Issues Committee to name representatives to meet with Page in a council to coordinate the Government’s highway activities. At its first meeting June 8, 1918, this United States Highway Council elected Mr. Page as chairman, and thereafter until it dissolved on November 13, 1918, the Council passed on over 7,300 applications for highway financing, railway cars or materials. By acting as a clearinghouse for the industry, the Council drastically shortened the time required for project approvals, approving 95 percent of the asphalt applied for, 50 percent of the crushed stone, and 45 percent of the open top cars, but only 12 percent of the steel and 15 percent of the highway financing.

With so much destruction occurring in such a short time, primarily as a result of national defense needs, it was inevitable that there should be appeals to Congress to pay for the damage. Representative John G. Cooper of Ohio introduced a bill “to aid the States in the maintenance, repair, and reconstruction of roads subjected to extraordinary wear by reason of the use of such roads by the Government of the United States.” This bill never emerged from committee, probably because its essential purpose was accomplished by other legislation.

The production of trucks was not greatly restricted during the war, and in fact was encouraged. Throughout 1918 the truck factories turned out about 19,000 units per month, and at the end of 1918 there were about 525,000 nonmilitary trucks of all sizes registered in the United States. This was an increase of 199,000 over 1917.

In spite of war restrictions on fuel and the generally poor condition of the roads, for-hire trucking thrived in an atmosphere unclouded by Government regulation and surcharged by intense competition. The heavy demand for trucking was not due solely to the failure of the railroads and their embargoes on short-haul package freight. Shippers were becoming aware that for short hauls, trucks could greatly shorten delivery time. This was dramatically illustrated early in the war when a disastrous fire occurred in Salem, Massachusetts. Using trucks to bring tents to shelter the victims, the National Guard was able to complete the trip from Framingham, 42 miles away, in only 3 hours. Due mostly to terminal delays, this shipment would have taken 2 days by rail.

Trucking also saved drayage charges at both ends of the shipment, and these, even in normal times, were often more than the railroad freight charges. Also, shippers soon found that boxing and crating could often be omitted without increasing breakage. Thus, although the cost of truck hauling was 12 to 25 cents per ton-mile, this was no greater than the total door-to-door cost of rail shipment for short haul trips.

Despite the intense and unregulated competition, a number of reliable motor carriers established regular service between the principal cities. Beginning in November 1917, the Beam Fletcher Corporation operated twenty-two 5-ton White trucks between Philadelphia and New York carrying 400 tons per day. Early in 1918 the Liberty Highway Company began a motor express business between Toledo and Detroit with daily runs of a 5-ton, four-wheel-drive Walter truck pulling three 5-ton trailers. The running time was 7½ to 9 hours one way, depending on the weather and the condition of a 12-mile stretch of unsurfaced dirt road on the main route between these cities. (If the road was bad, the driver might have to pull his trailers through the 12-mile gap one at a time.)

In Maryland, the Farmers’ Cooperative Association of Harford County obtained a franchise to operate a motor express on the Baltimore-Bel Air Road to haul milk and produce to Baltimore, returning with empty milk cans and package express for the farmers. And in Alabama the Civic Association of Birmingham averted a coal famine by contracting with the Jenkins Motor Company to haul 200 tons of coal per day direct from the mines to consumers.

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