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Philippines, however, soon began calling for a complete withdrawal of the unit. Some members of the Philippine Congress wanted to "punish" the United States for imagined support of Malaysia during the Sabah crises. Other critics felt that there was a legitimate need for the unit at home to oppose a Huk insurgency in central Luzon. Still others considered that supporting even the modest cost of maintaining the civic action group in Vietnam was a continuing financial burden. Since the required funds had been refused by the Philippine Congress, the group was being financed by regular armed forces funds plus $17 million for engineer equipment and $1.5 million annual support provided by the United States.

When the new table of equipment was approved in February 1969 little attention was given to the occasion either by the press or by the public and there were no significant displays of feeling against the Philippine group in Vietnam. In March, however, the Nacionalista party House caucus voted to withdraw the civic action group and replace it with a medical contingent. At the same time approaches were being made to U.S. officials for complete financing of the Philippine Civic Action Group by the United States. This situation raised the question of whether the United States should pick up the entire cost of the Philippine Civic Action Group or be prepared to see the group pull out.

A review revealed that while the Philippine group had done a "passable job" on those construction jobs it had completed, the group could have done more, and that South Vietnamese or U.S. resources could have accomplished the same results. The security battalion and artillery battery had not been assigned offensive missions and had thus contributed nothing to the power of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to carry on offensive operations. The Philippine force did provide a degree of security to the population of the Tay Ninh City area in which it worked, but since Philippine units engaged in combat only in self-defense, the secure area did not extend beyond the immediate vicinity of the Philippine base camp or work sites. As for any psychological impact, the trade-off was between the loss of some allied solidarity–tempered by the fact that a contingent would remain in South Vietnam–and the resentment that many Vietnamese felt against the Philippine force. This resentment was strengthened by the traditional Vietnamese xenophobia and reluctance to accept assistance from a nation which had its own problems of internal corruption, underdevelopment, and even limited insurgency. In mid-April the U.S. Embassy stated:

"On balance, therefore, we feel that we should not ourselves take any"