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search through the bunker complexes. As a result of these measures only two casualties were suffered from booby traps.

Two engineer bulldozers and two platoons of engineer troops were used throughout the sealing operation. Their mission consisted of cutting north-south, east-west trails in the area swept by the advancing troops. A route was selected to be cut and the engineers then cleared the jungle area with bangalore torpedoes. Bulldozers followed and increased the width of the cut to forty meters. Infantry elements provided security for the engineers during these operations.

Throughout the maneuver the advance of the infantry troops was on line and void of gaps as the sweeps forced the enemy toward the center. Thai night security was outstanding. On three successive occasions the Viet Cong tried to break out of the trap, and in all three instances they were repulsed. Intelligence reported that seven Viet Cong were wounded during these attempts.

In conjunction with the tactical operations, the U.S.-Thai team conducted psychological operations. All returnees under the Chieu Hoi (open arms) amnesty program were fully interviewed and in 60 percent of the cases tapes of these interviews were made. These tapes were normally played back to the Viet Cong within four hours. The themes were basically a plea to the Viet Cong to return to the fold of the government while it was still possible, to eliminate their leaders and rally, to receive medical care, and to bring their weapons. When Viet Cong rallied without their weapons, a weapons leaflet was dropped and the next returnees brought in weapons. Once all means of drawing the enemy out had been used and continued efforts were unsuccessful, a C-47 aircraft with miniguns was employed to saturate totally the sealed square kilometer area.

The results of this operation were 14 of the enemy killed, 6 prisoners, and 12 returnees. Some 21 small arms and 2 crew-served weapons were also captured.

While air support was used in the last stage of this particular operation, the Thais in general made limited use of air power. Liaison officers of the U.S. Air Force participating in other Thai operations found that planned air strikes were more readily accepted by Thai ground commanders than close tactical air support. The Thai Army division headquarters requested one planned strike every day. The request was made so automatically and as a matter of routine that it seemed to U.S. troops in the tactical air control party that the Thais were accepting the planned strikes out of typical Thai politeness.