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The one revision of the Honolulu Conference decisions was to ask the Republic of Korea for a division and not a regimental combat team; it was expected in South Vietnam in mid-June.

The Honolulu Conference also introduced a general concept of operations by U.S. and allied ground combat forces in support of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. A number of assumptions undergirded the discussion: national forces would retain command identity; the United States would not place its forces under the operational control of the Vietnam armed forces as allied commanders, though the Republic of Vietnam might in a special case place its forces under U.S. operational control; and allied forces would accept operational control by U.S. commanders, and combat units would normally be placed under operational control of U.S. commanders at brigade level or higher. The mission of U.S. and allied forces was "to render advice and/or combat support to RVNAF."

General Westmoreland in early May set forth the "procedures and command relationship" involved in commitments of additional U.S. ground forces, and the underlying concept of an international military security task force first discussed in April. According to this concept allied forces were to be "brigaded" with U.S. forces under a U.S. commander and a combined staff. The U.S. brigade would be the nucleus of the international security force, which would be employed in a manner similar to that of a U.S. brigade. The mission of allied forces was set down in three stages. The first stage was base security; the second, after the bases were secure, was deep patrolling and offensive operations involving reconnaissance and moves against Viet Cong bases and areas; and the third was search missions for enemy units further afield in co-ordination with Vietnam armed forces. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, would assume operational control of U.S. and allied forces upon their arrival in Vietnam. General Westmoreland reiterated that U.S. forces would not be placed under operational control or command of allied commanders.

The international security force concept per se, which envisioned a multinational force blocking infiltration through the demilitarized zone, and the attendant concept of brigading Free World and U.S. units were later dropped. Other countries and the Republic of Vietnam had shown little interest, there were many political problems, and, most significantly, the bulk of enemy infiltration skirted the demilitarized zone and came through Laos. The concept of a three-stage mission was retained.