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survey concluded that the manpower resources of South Vietnam were adequate to support both the "quantitative and qualitative requirements of RVNAF provided the resources were used effectively," there was an apparent need for more troop strength quickly. General Westmoreland had reported on 3 April evidence of the presence of elements of the 325th Division of the People's Army of [North] Vietnam in South Vietnam. This discovery plus the deteriorating security situation in I and II Corps Tactical Zones was the background of both the diplomatic probes to obtain Free World forces and the preparation of a Joint Chiefs plan of action and time schedule to send a two- or three-division force into South Vietnam.

With the basic decision made to commit Free World combat forces when needed, policy and plans began to be formulated to bring about the deployment and to establish command relationships.

In messages to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Commander in Chief, Pacific, General Westmoreland outlined his proposed command relationship for the employment of Free World troops. The Korean division, according to General Westmoreland's recommendation, would not be attached to the U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary force but would constitute the major Free World component of an international military security task force to block infiltration through the demilitarized zone. General Westmoreland wanted, however, to deploy the Korean force first around Quang Ngai to provide security for port and base development there. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific, directed this on 10 April. Free World units would be attached or assigned to U.S. brigades with combined staff representation to give these forces an international flavor and still allow the United States to retain full authority over its own forces.

General Westmoreland also proposed "a mechanism at the national level to control international forces"–involving the joint exercise of authority by Commander in Chief, Vietnamese Armed Forces, and Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam–the formulation of a small, single, combined staff headed by a U.S. general, a Vietnamese deputy chief of combined staff, and a multinational staff. This staff would develop the parameters of strategic guidance, rules of engagement, and command relationships. The small combined staff which General Westmoreland wanted established would provide staff supervision and direction of multinational forces in the event major multinational forces were assigned to South Vietnam, no nation-