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relationships to provide the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, with effective command of U.S. and allied ground forces so that combat operations would in turn be properly co-ordinated with those of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs again solicited the views of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, on projected logistical and command arrangements necessary to implement the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs, who had concluded that "the needs of the military situation in SVN have become primary, and direct military action appears to be imperative if defeat is to be avoided."

Ambassador Taylor, in response to the Joint Chiefs' proposals, indicated that he had strong reservation against sending marines to Da Nang, but that he would support General Westmoreland's recommendation for one battalion landing team to provide security for Da Nang. No sooner was the deployment approved, the marines on their way, and Vietnam government consent sought, than the State Department requested Taylor's views on the possible use of an international–that is, a multilateral–force in Vietnam.

The ambassador's first reaction to the idea of an international combat force for northern South Vietnam was not favorable. The Australian envoy to South Vietnam as well as Ambassador Taylor felt that the deployment of such a force might heighten Vietnamese xenophobia and encourage the government of Vietnam to let the U.S. government assume an even greater share of the burden.

The idea of a multilateral or international combat force, of which Ambassador Taylor disapproved, was raised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, upon his return from a Vietnam fact-finding trip in March 1965. Specifically in the fourteenth point of his report, General Johnson recommended seeking a commitment from Australia and New Zealand to take responsibility for establishing Regional Forces training centers and thus broadening the international nature of the war against the Communists. The Secretary of Defense concurred but also suggested the deployment of a Korean division. He noted in his concurrence with General Johnson's recommendation that the policy of the United States was now to send anything that would strengthen the position of the government of Vietnam.

General Johnson also attempted to resurrect (without success) the notion of invoking the terms of the Southeast Asia