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At the time the memorandum was written sixteen countries including the United States were already providing aid–some advisory military but largely economical and technical–to South Vietnam. At the end of December the Philippine, Korean, and Nationalist Chinese governments had made known through diplomatic channels their readiness to provide military assistance to South Vietnam.

The 1 December White House meeting appears to have been crucial in determining the manner of soliciting allied support and the nature of the relationship between the Republic of Vietnam and the allies. President Johnson then strongly felt the need for "new, dramatic, effective" forms of assistance, specifically from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Philippines; Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, felt that Britain, too, could help. (Inexplicably, aid from the Republic of Korea was not discussed at the December meeting.) It was decided to seek "military and political cooperation" from these allies. General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, was to inform the White House what kind of assistance would be welcome after explaining U.S. policy and consulting with government officials of Vietnam. The parameters of Ambassador Taylor's discussions with the Vietnam government clearly had been laid down at the 1 December White House meeting. Thus the initiative in seeking allied help for Vietnam came first from the United States. The government of Vietnam did have a voice, however, in determining the nature of allied assistance.

In November 1964, prior to Taylor's return to Washington, Major General Nguyen Khanh, the head of state in South Vietnam, had mentioned to him in reference to the more flags appeal that South Vietnam had only a general need for additional manpower for the military and police. Upon his return to South Vietnam in December, acting on his instructions from President Johnson, Taylor emphasized in a 7 December meeting with Vietnam government officials the importance of Free World assistance from the U.S. domestic point of view but stressed that the United States did not want to "internationalize" the war on the pattern of Korea. The issue really involved making Free World support concretely evident. To this principle General Khanh and Brigadier General Cao Van Vien agreed.

It must be kept in mind at this point that aside from tentative probes of the attitudes of the government of Australia and the government of New Zealand no effort was being made to secure