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U.S. Ambassador to Korea to offer a number of concessions to the Korean government to insure the prompt deployment of the Korean division to Vietnam. The United States agreed to suspend the Military Assistance Program transfer project for as long as the Korean government maintained substantial forces in Vietnam. The United States also agreed to offshore procurement from Korea for transfer items such as petroleum, oil, lubricants, and construction materials listed in the fiscal year 1966 Military Assistance Program. Subsequently, and during the period of the transfer program, the United States would determine offshore procurement from Korea on the basis of individual items and under normal offshore procurement procedures.

These concessions to the Korean government were made, however, with the understanding that the budgetary savings accruing to Korea from the actions taken would contribute to a substantial military and civil service pay-raise for Koreans. Actually, the Korean government would not incur any additional costs in deploying the division to Vietnam but would secure a number of economic benefits. On the other hand, the cost to the United States for Koreans already in Vietnam approximated $2,000,000 annually, and first year costs for the operation of the Korean division in Vietnam were estimated at $43,000,000.

In a later communication on 16 July 1965, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, informed the Commander in Chief, Pacific, of other decisions that had been made in resolving the Korean requests. With respect to the reduction of U.S. force levels in Korea, the U.S. Commander in Korea and the American Ambassador to Korea, Winthrop D. Brown, prepared a letter assuring the Korean government that President Johnson's earlier decision that there would be no reduction in U.S. force levels remained unchanged, and that any further redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea would be discussed with the Korean government officials beforehand.

By August agreement had been reached with the Korean government on the force structure of the division and support troop augmentation, but the military aspects of control and command and the proposed unified Korean headquarters were still under discussion. Consolidated equipment lists for the Korean division, understrength, and the Marine force, as well as the table of allowances for a Korean field support command had been developed and were to be forwarded to General Westmoreland. In logistics, initial and follow-up support of Class II, IV, and V supplies had been settled, but the matter of Class III supplies could not be resolved until information had been received