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[Mil]itary Assistance Program in accordance with Howze's letter to Minister Kim. Accordingly, on 13 September 1964, at the request of the Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea deployed the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital and instructors.

In late December 1964, after a request from the Republic of Vietnam, the Korean government organized an engineer construction support group to assist the Vietnamese armed forces in restoring war-damaged areas in furtherance of Vietnamese pacification efforts. During the period February to June 1965, a Korean construction support group, a Korean Marine Corps engineer company, Korean Navy LST's and LSM's, and a Korean Army security company were dispatched. These elements, totaling 2,416 men, designated the Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, were better known by their nickname, Dove Unit.

In early 1965, the government of Vietnam, aware that additional assistance was needed to combat the growing Viet Cong pressure, officially asked the Republic of Korea to provide additional noncombatants. The immediate reason for this request was that Vietnamese troops had been diverted to civic action projects related to the heavy flooding during the fall monsoon in 1964. The Korean government agreed that more support could be provided and undertook to supply a task force composed of the commander of the Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam; an Army engineer battalion; an Army transport company; a Marine engineer company; one LST with crew; a security battalion; a service unit; a liaison group, and a mobile hospital (already in Vietnam).

Arrangements for arrival of the Dove Unit were completed by the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council on 6 February. In September a revised military working agreement was signed between the Korean Military Assistance Group and the Vietnam Air Force and on 8 February an arrangement between the commander of the Korean group and General Rosson. The arrangement between the Korean and Vietnamese governments included several unusual features. The Koreans were not to fire unless attacked, but in any event, could not fire on or pursue the enemy outside the area delineated for Korean operations. In case of a Viet Cong attack, the senior Vietnam Army commander in the area would provide assistance. Koreans were not to act against civil demonstrations unless forced to by circumstances and authorized by a Vietnam Army liaison officer. Operational control was not mentioned in these arrangements, although it was implied that in combat action the senior Vietnam Army